Abstract-With the increased focus on Internet privacy, especially after the exposure of PRISM(an Internet surveillance program), anonymous communication have been getting more and more attentions. One of the most widely used anonymous communication systems is I2P(Invisible Internet Project). And as opposed to Tor's(another popular anonymous communication system) directory-based approach, which provides a centralized directory server to manage the overall 'view' of the network, I2P is fully distributed and self organizing, which aims to avoid attackers' enumeration of all I2P's routers. In this paper, based on I2P's operating mechanism, we presented two passive and two active methods to discover I2P routers. In a more than two week's collecting experiment, about 25640 routers were discovered everyday, which turned out to be an almost full coverage(94.9%) of the I2P network compared with the data announced on the official website [1] . And based on the routers collected, this paper further made a preliminary analysis of both the I2P network's overall status and its security. The result showed that I2P is a well structured P2P network, while some powerful attackers operating several routers are still possible to perform compromise attack to break I2P users' anonymity given the current I2P's security mechanism. Finally, this paper discussed some countermeasures to improve the security of the I2P network.
I. INTRODUCTION
O VER the last decades, with the increase of people's online activities, there is a growing concern on people's privacy and anonymity. And early in 2013, the exposure of PRISM further enhanced people's awareness of privacy protection. As a result, anonymous communications, which can preserve users' privacy and anonymity against eavesdroppers or third-party sniffing, have been gaining more and more attentions.
I2P(Internet Invisible Project), a low-latency messageoriented anonymous network, was mainly designed to , another popular anonymous system, I2P doesn't aim to enable anonymous access to the normal Internet service, but to integrate the existing Internet services into the I2P network. I2P contains a full range of available applications: web browsing, chatting, file sharing, email and blogging etc, and all the applications interact with each other within the I2P network boundaries.
I2P is a fully distributed network based on Kad [3] , and is formed by a large number of volunteer-run routers. In recent years, many studies have been done to analyze the mechanism and usage characterization of I2P, as well as attacks to the I2P network, but research on I2P routers, the basic elements of the I2P network, has not received enough attention. In this paper, we made the following contributions:
• Two passive methods for router collecting are proposed: 1) Based on the fact that when establishing tunnels between I2P routers, they will first exchange their router information, we run a normal I2P router to collect the routers that our router request to join our tunnels and the routers whose tunnels pass our routers, 2) Exploiting I2P's update mechanism of routing key, we further run a FloodFill router to collect the routers that publish their information to us.
• Two active methods for router collecting are proposed: 1) Crawling the reseed websites hard-coded in the I2P sources, 2) As I2P is based on Kad, we manually set the search key of the DLM(Database Lookup Message, used to query information from the I2P network database), and send it to the I2P network database to get new routers.
• Based on the collected routers, this paper further made a preliminary analysis, including the fluctuation of the routers, the problem of IP/ID aliases, and the distribution of I2P routers over /16 subnet, country and AS. The results proved that, although I2P is a well structured P2P network, it's still under the threat of compromise attack from a powerful attacker.
• At last, this paper discussed some countermeasures to further improve the security of I2P.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related works on I2P, and Section 3 introduces the cultural background and several key concepts in I2P. In Section 4, we present the methods for I2P router collecting. And in Section 5, we make a preliminary analysis of the collected routers and discussed some countermeasures to improve I2P's security. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Nowadays, privacy and anonymity are gaining wider and wider attentions. As one of the most widely used anonymous systems, the I2P network is also receiving more and more academic attentions. In recent years, there are many studies regarding the mechanism, attacks and usage characterization of the I2P network.
In [4] and [5] , a brief overview of the I2P network is presented, including both the project and technical overview. The author described the motivation and applied technology of I2P. zzz et al. [6] presents an analysis of the peer profiling in I2P, discussing both its advantages and disadvantages. The authors argue that although I2P's profiling algorithm is efficient when finding faster routers, it's not easy to trade off anonymity and performance, although a user can tweak the length of a tunnel to make its connection either faster or more anonymous.
Crenshaw et al. [7] takes the advantage of the lack of control in the application layer, which means the errors and misconfiguration made during the implementation and use of an I2P web server, to reveal the identities of anonymous websites. Their success indicated that it was important to properly set up an application running on top of the I2P network. More recently, Herrmann et al. [5] presents a new attack on the I2P network, with the goal of identifying peers that are anonymously hosting HTTP services in the network. They proposed that an adversary with modest resources can conduct the attack in three steps: 1) get an estimate of victim's view of the network, 2) attack the victim's fastest peers tier, so as to replace them with the attacker's peers, 3) identify peers offering anonymous web services by performing traffic analysis. They ascribe the success of the attack to the churn of the fast and high capacity tier, and based on the analysis, they further propose some countermeasures.
Timpanaro et al. [8] - [11] gives the I2P network a bird's view about the network usage, from an application point of view. They developed a high-level distributed monitoring architecture for I2P, and aimed to characterize the use of the running services on top of the I2P network, such as web servers and file-sharing clients. Their results showed that the most activities within the I2P network are file-sharing and anonymous web-hosting. They also assess the uptime of anonymous web servers, the geographical location of nodes and the network popularity.
As described above, although many studies have been done to analyze and improve the I2P network, they mainly focus on the operating mechanism, the anonymous crack and the measurement of services run in the I2P network.
While this paper aims to make a preliminary analysis of the I2P routers which formed the I2P network. In this paper, we first deployed several systems to collect as many as possible I2P routers, and then based on the collected data, we characterized the the I2P network from several points of view. And finally, based on the analysis, this paper proposed some countermeasures to improve the security of the I2P network. -
III. THE I2P NETWORK
I2P is a scalable and distributed overlay communication network, which aims to provide a manner of anonymous communication. Actually, the applications and users in I2P are not reachable through an IP, but through a location independent identifier, a value generated by SHA256.
A. Overview
The I2P network is formed by a group of volunteersrunning routers, and these routers implement the I2P protocol, upon which anonymous communication can be achieved. I2P makes a strict distinction between the software participating in the network (a "router") and the anonymous endpoints ("destinations") associated with individual applications. The fact that someone is running I2P is not usually a secret. What is hidden is information on which destination is associated to which router. This decoupling provides a certain degree of anonymity.
Similar with Tor, which uses the well-known onion routing approach, in which a message is routed from its originator to the final endpoint through several intermediate nodes using layered encryption as shown in Fig.1(a) , I2P uses a variation of onion routing called Garlic Routing, in which several messages along with their delivery instructions can be encapsulated into a single message and encrypted with the receiver's key as shown in Fig.1(b) . The following sections will describe a few key concepts in I2P.
B. I2P Tunnels
A tunnel is a directed path through an explicitly selected list of routers [12] . To avoid information leakage, I2P tunnels use layered encryption, so each of the router along the tunnel can only decrypt a single layer. The decrypted information contains the IP address of the next peer, along with the encrypted information to be forwarded. Tunnels in I2P are unidirectional and messages can be sent only in one way. Depending on the usage, I2P tunnels can be divided into two categories:
• Exploratory: tunnels used for both network database maintenance and tunnel maintenance.
• Client: tunnels used for end to end client messages. While based on the transmission direction, there are also two types of tunnels exist:
• Outbound: tunnels used to send messages away from the tunnel creator.
• Inbound: tunnels used to receive messages to the tunnel creator.
Tunnels allows I2P users to send messages to each other. Usually, a fully bidirectional communication between two users always invoke four client tunnels, one inbound and one outbound for each user. Fig.2 [12] illustrates a typical I2P communication procedure. As a necessary, Alice and Bob should maintain several inbound and outbound tunnels respectively. Then Alice sends a message through her outbound tunnel, targeting at one of Bob's inbound tunnel gateway (how Alice knows Bob's inbound tunnel gateways will be introduced in the network database section). Once the message reaches the gateway, it is forwarded to Bob's router. The response from Bob follows a similar way. Worthy to note that during the communication, Alice does not have knowledge about Bob's inbound tunnel except the entry point, and this separates Bob from its identity, which leads to the earlier mentioned anonymity. Every tunnel comprises a gateway (the first router), a set of participants(intermediate routers) and an endpoint(exit router), and the router for a specific I2P tunnel should be explicitly selected.
C. Routers
As a router may maintain a large number of tunnels(both client and exploratory) to support its normal operation, and a tunnel's lifetime is only 10 minutes, a user need to frequently select new nodes for its tunnels. Next, this paper will describe how a router maintains its view of the whole network and selects routers for its tunnels' building.
1) Router Profiling.: Unlike tor, which relies on routers' self-reported capabilities, I2P does not use any prior claimed performance data published by the router itself, and every I2P router maintains a process of router profiling that collects data based on the observed performance of other routers. The collecting is based on the router's usual communication, and all kind of other routers' indirected behavior is recorded. Leaning on a constantly local profiling of all seen router, the router apply a three-tier scheme to classify other routers according to their speed and capacity (Here, speed estimates how much data we can send or receive on a single tunnel through the router in a minute and capacity estimates how many tunnels the router would agree to participate in over a given time period):
• High Capacity: nodes whose capacity meets or exceeds the median of all routers.
• Fast: nodes that are already "high capacity" and whose speed meets or exceeds the median of all routers.
• Standard: the rest nodes. Fig.3 illustrates the containment relationship of the three tiers. And for a single router, the fast group is limited to 30, high capacity group limited to 75, while the standard group has no fixed limit.
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High Capacity Routers Fast Routers 2) Router Selection.: Router selection is the process of choosing which routers in the network we want to relay our messages to go through (which routers will we ask to join our tunnels) [12] . The I2P router uses the routers' profiles described above to estimate how fast they are and how often they would like to accept our tunnel building requests. Then routers are randomly chosen from the fast and high capacity tier, and then the chosen routers are ordered through out the tunnel according to the XOR distance from a random key value.
D. I2P Network Database
NetDB(Network Database) is another key concept within the I2P network, which is used to store and share routers' and destinations' contact information. Although NetDB comes from the KAD protocol, not every router in the I2P network forms part of the DHT, but only those fast and high-performance routers, so called FF(floodfill) routers.
Two types of network metadata are stored in NetDB:
• Leaseset: a leaseset provides contact information to a specific destination, like a web server, etc.
• Routerinfo: a routerinfo provides contact information to a specific router, including the router identity, the IP address and port, etc. In Fig.? ?, before sending a message to Bob, Alice first queries the NetDB for the contact information of Bob, with Bob's identity as the search key. When receiving a search message, the NetDB returns the respective leasesets or routerinfo to the querier.
E. Comparison with Tor
The main difference between Tor and I2P is that I2P tries to move existing Internet services into the I2P network whereas Tor tries to enable anonymous access to Internet services outside of Tor network. Although Tor has hidden services and I2P has outproxy, Tor is mainly used to access external services and I2P is mainly used to access integrated Internet services.
I2P and Tor also differ in a number of other ways, and Table I summarizes the main differences between the two anonymous systems. 
IV. I2P ROUTERS DISCOVERY
In this section, we will introduce our experimental strategies for the proposed methods of I2P router collecting.
A. Passive Methods 1) Running A Normal I2P Router: As mentioned in the previous III, in order to maintain normal operation, an I2P router needs to continuously select routers to build both client and exploratory tunnels. And during the communication between any two routers, they usually exchange their router information. As an example, the process of direct connection between Alice and Bob is shown in Figure 4 Based on this mechanism, by running a normal I2P router, we can both collect routers that wants to build tunnels through us and update information of routers that we send tunnel build requests to.
2) Running An I2P FloodFill Router: In order to harden a localized Sybil attack, I2P uses two types of keys in its implementation, identity key and routing key, to uniquely identify a router in the I2P network. An identity key is generated when an I2P router runs for the first time, and it remains fixed as long as the user doesn't rebuild or delete the router. While a routing key is used to index (query or store) a record in the NetDB, and is computed as HASH(ID + date), where the ID is the identity key, and date is the current date. Routing key is recomputed at every midnight, as a result, all indexing keys will be changed and therefore republished in other locations in the DHT space. Although this approach may cause some queries to fail around midnight, it help to avoid an attacker to launch a simple localized Sybil attack, because the attacker will have to recompute its Sybils IDs every midnight.
While improving security against Sybil attack, the design of routing key provides a possibility of collecting routers in the I2P network. Figure 5 shows the coverage of routing keys generated in a year for two I2P routers over the SHA256 hash space. In Figure 5 , the SHA256 space is divided into 16 4-bit zones, where an 4-bit zone contains the routers whose routing key agree in the first 4 bits, and we can see that the routing keys of I2P routers can cover the whole key space as the date changes(here, we don't focus on the number of routing keys located at each 4-bit zone, but the almost fully distribution of the routing keys over the whole key space). As described in III, I2P is based on Kad and only those floodfill peers form the DHT. Besides, in order to better integrate into the I2P network, a I2P router usually asks the closest floodfill peers for other routers' information. As a result, the changing of routing key described above may also changes the group of floodfill peers that a router querys, which means that a router may communicate with a different group of floodfill peers at every midnight. However, the changing of routing key is applied to all the I2P routers, indicating that although changing is made every midnight, part of the group of the floodfill peers a router query may remain the same. The deeper view of this changing is still in progress. Despite the uncertainty of changing, our method proves that the changing of routing key indeed makes a contribution to enumerate I2P routers. We simply run an I2P floodfill router without any modification to its operation mechanism, and use it to collect routers which communicate with the floodfill router. Figure 6 shows the situation of routers collected using this method. 
1) Crawling ReseedURLs:
Like all other P2P networks, considering the problem of users' no knowledge of the network at its first joining, I2P adopts a method called reseed. When an I2P client does not find enough routers available in its local NetDb, it will start a reseed job to get routers from several reseedURLs hard-coded in the I2P software source. At the time of our experiment, the latest version of I2P is 0.9.5, and the reseedURLs of I2P 0.9.5 are listed in Table II . Obviously, in Table II , every URL exists in both the standard and SSL forms. Actually, if SSL is not disabled in the I2P configuration file, the I2P client will first use the https randomly and then the http randomly, otherwise it will just use the http randomly. As the hosts of http and https for every reseedURL are same, in our experiments, we only take the standard form of reseedURLs into consideration. As a result, we totally consider 9 http reseedURLs.
We first test the availability of the reseedURLs, that is whether we can get routers from them, and then for those available reseedURLs, we count the number of routers we can get from them at one time. The results are shown in Table III . We also measure the update mode for each reseedURL. we sent a reseed request to every reseedURL per half an hour and based on the data collected from 2013-05-16 04:30:00 to 2013-05-20 00:00:00, we classified the reseedURLs into two categories according to their update mode: update per request and update per 24.5 hours. For the first category, there is only one reseedURL: netdb.i2p2.de, as shown in Figure 7 , upon receiving a reseed request, it always send back a few new routers to the requester. While the remaining available six reseedURLs are all belong to the second category, they update once per 24.5 hours, but the specific time to update is not fixed, for example, cowpuncher.drollette.com updates at 10:00:00 on 2013-05-16, at 10:30:00 on 2013-05-17, and at 11:00:00 on 2013-05-18. Based on reseedURLs' update mode, we set the script for collecting routers from them to run per 30mins for netdb.i2p2.de, and per 1470mins(24 hours plus 30 mins) for the remaining 6 reseedURLs. 2) Exploiting NetDB: When an I2P router don't have enough routers available locally or want to communicate with some destinations, it will send a DLM to several FF(FloodFill) peers nearest to it. And upon receiving a DLM, a FF peer will lookup the router contained in the DLM locally, once it finds it, it will response the query with a DSM(DatabaseStoreMessage), which contains the information of the requested router, otherwise it will response with a DSRM (DatabaseSearchReplyMessage), which contains 3 routers closest to the search key by XOR distance. One thing should be noted here, in DLM, there is a field called "donotInclude", which specifies the routers that FF peers should not response with. However, if "donotInclude" is set to FAKE HASH, which is a constant fixed in the I2P source, then the DSRM only contains non-FF peers, otherwise it will only contain FF peers.
Base on I2P's mechanism of query and response described above, we take the following steps to collect I2P routers: step 1: Estimate the distribution of FF peers in the I2P network. step 2: Using DLM with no "donotInclude" to collect FF peers. step 3: Estimate the distribution of I2P routers stored on a FF peer. step 4: For each FF peer, using DLM with "donotInclude" set to FAKE HASH to collect non-FF peers stored on it.
a) Collecting Floodfill Peers.: According to the data published on [1] , there are about 400 FF peers existed in the I2P network. As the NetDb of I2P has a 2 256 DHT space, and due to the randomness of hash function, which will be proved by the analysis in section V, then the distance in terms of bits for every two FF peers can be calculated using Equation 1.
Based on the distance calculated above, we construct 512 search keys which are different with each other in the first 9 bits of the 256 bits. Then Algorithm 1 is used to collect FF peers. 
Require:
The set of FF peers already queried, F F q ; The set of FF peers need to be queried, F F n ; The set of 512 search keys, KEY ; Ensure:
1: Initialize F F n with known FF peers; 2: while F F n is not empty do
for each j ∈ KEY do 5:
send a DLM with j as search key to i
6:
if received key k not in F F q or F F n then add i to F F q ; 11: delete i from F F n 12: end while 13: return F F q ; Figure 8 shows the number of collected FF peers per hour using Algorithm 1. And from Figure 9 , we can see that the distribution of collected FF peers over the 4-bits key space is relatively uniform, which means the distance we choose above is reasonable, otherwise FF peers may be divided into several clusters. There is an attribute called "netdb.knownRouters" in the routerinfo files of every FF peer, which indicates the number of routers the specified FF peer knows. Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of the values of "netdb.knownRouters" for collected 343 FF peers, and we get the average value of "netdb.knownRouters" is 2947 for the 343 FF peers. 
Based on the above analysis, for every FF peer, we construct 3000 search keys using distance 241(bits), with the key of the FF peer as the center and 1500 smaller and 1500 larger. Then we use the following Algorithm 2, which is modified from Algorithm 1, to collect normal routers.
Algorithm 2 Collecting Normal Routers.
Require:
The set of FF peers known, F F ; The set of normal routers collected, ROU T ER; The set of 3000 search keys, KEY ; Ensure:
1: Initialize F F with known FF peers; 2: while F F is not empty do
construct the set of 3000 search keys, KEY
5:
for each j ∈ KEY do 6:
7:
if received key k not in ROU T ER then 8: add k to ROU T ER delete i from F F 12: end while 13: return ROU T ER; V. ANALYSIS Using the methods described in previous sections, we totally got 41166 I2P routers for a period of two weeks in 2013, and the contributions of each method are show in Table IV (because some routers are discovered by more than one methods, so the sum of the proportions is greater than 1). Based on the collected routers, this section will make a preliminary analysis, including the fluctuation of the I2P routers, the phenomenon of IP/ID aliases, and the distribution of I2P routers over /16 subnets, countries and ASes. A. Fluctuation of I2P Routers
As a P2P network, I2P have users joining and leaving constantly. From the perspective of network stability, the longer the routers stay in the network, the more stable the network will be. Figure 11 shows the survival time of routers in the I2P network, and we can learn that there are 7834 routers surviving only one day in the network, which accounts for 19.03% of the total 41166 collected routers. Meanwhile, there are 20031 routers, 48.66% of the collected routers, surviving more than 7 days. As a result, although lots of routers only stay in the I2P network for 1 day, about half of the I2P routers survive more than 7 days, which can be considered to be stable, and contributes to the stability of the whole network. We also make a statistic of routers appearing at everyday of a week, as illustrated in Figure 12 . It is obvious that the number of routers achieved a small peak at weekends, which confirms the P2P users' habits. 
C. IP and ID Alias
In the process of analysis, we noted that there are some routers which have same IP addresses but with different IDes, or have same IDes but with different IP addresses. Based on the routers collected, Table V shows the details about the alias phenomenon in the I2P network. We consider the DSL users contribute to the hash alias, as a DSL user, whenever it connects to the network, it may be assigned a new IP address. While for the IP alias, that may due to the users located behind a NAT network, these users share a same IP address appearing to the outside network.
D. /16 Subnet. Figure 14 shows the distribution of routers over /16 subnets, and it shows that about 95% of /16 subnets have less than 5 I2P routers located in it, which means the distribution of routers at the level of /16 subnet is quite uniform. This paper also plotted the distribution of routers over countries, as illustrated in Figure 15 (a). Russia has the most I2P users, comprising about 33.3% of the total I2P users, and America has the second most I2P users, about 19.4% of the total I2P users. In order to prevent the compromise attacks from a single /16 subnet, I2P never selects two routers from a same /16 subnet to build a tunnel. So we focus on the routers which belong to different /16 subnets but belong to a same country. Figure  15(b) shows the number of /16 subnets in the I2P network belonging to different countries. We see that America has the most I2P's /16 subnets, approximately 1000 subnets. And in total, there are 71 countries, out of collected 93 countries, that have more than one I2P's /16 subnets. This fact shows that, although I2P will not select more than one nodes from a single subnet, nodes controlled by a same country are still possible to appear in a single I2P tunnel. G. Discussion.
In I2P, in order to avoid collusion attack, two or more I2P peers within the same /16 subnet cannot be used within the same tunnel. However, as described above, although routers belong to different /16 subnet, they may belong to a same country or AS. As a result, country and AS level attackers are still possible to perform a collusion attack. In order to avoid such attacks, two possible solutions were proposed here:
• Operators of I2P routers should be encouraged to add a "Group"(similar with the "Family" in Tor) tag in their routers' descriptor, and the routers run by a same operator should have the same tag. Given the tag, an I2P user should not select more than a router which have the same tag to build a tunnel.
• Against with the malicious operators who don't claim a same tag for the routers run by themselves, I2P software should maintain a country-and ASlevel map, which are used to choose routers located at different countries and different ASes to build tunnels.
The details of the solutions described above are still in progress, and we will discuss their implementations, pros and cons in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Although many research works have been done to analyze and improve the I2P system, research on I2P routers has not yet receive enough attentions. In this paper, we first proposed four approaches to collect I2P routers, and about 41166 routers were collected. Based on the collected routers, this paper further made an preliminary analysis of both the network's overall status and its security. The results showed that I2P is indeed a well organized and distributed P2P network, but as not anonymous as it designed, since a powerful country or AS-level attacker are still possible to perform a collusion attack and further deanonymize I2P users using watermarking technologies. At last, this paper also proposed several countermeasures to improve the anonymity of the I2P network.
